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COMPULSORY INTER-STATE ARBITRATION OF
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
Srecko "Lucky" Vidmar*
Just or unjust, the decision of the arbiterswill save the credit, the honour, of
the contendingparty. - Jeremy Bentham'
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from
Yugoslavia. The two former republics were welcomed as independent states by
the international community on January 15, 1992, when the European Community
(EC) extended its official recognition.2 The two richest and most developed
former republics followed markedly different paths during the decade following
Slovenia's steady investment in transportation and
their independence.
information infrastructure, modernization of its economy, and rebuilding of its
civil society earned it praise as "poster child" 3 of post-Communist development.
On the other hand, Croatia, led by President Franjo Tudjman, was economically
stagnant and diplomatically isolated following a bloody civil war and its
involvement in the Bosnian conflict.
The two neighboring states professed their friendship and closeness during the
1990s, but the regional war and the international ostracism resulting from Croatian
government policies had the effect of freezing all negotiations between the two
states regarding the final demarcation of their boundary. This diplomatic stalemate
resulted in frequent, and sometimes violent, skirmishes between Slovenian fishing
boats and the Croatian Navy in the Bay of Piran.
President Tudjman's death in December 1999, 4 was followed by a resounding
defeat of his party in the subsequent parliamentary elections. The new coalition
government was welcomed with renewed enthusiasm both by the people of Croatia

"J.D. Candidate, May 2003, University of Denver College of Law; B.S., 1994, M.S., 1997, University
of Colorado at Boulder. The author wishes to thank Catherine McNamara, Amber Paris, and Debby
Paris, for their encouragement, help, and support.
1. JEREMY BENTHAM, A Plan for Universal and Perpetual Peace, in PRINCIPLES OF
LAW (Bowring ed. 1843), available at http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/
poltheory/benthan/pil/index.html#nOlret (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
2. Maurizio Ragazzi, Conference on Yugoslavia ArbitrationCommission: Opinions on Questions
Arising From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1490 (1992).
3. According to the U.S. President Bill Clinton. Going Nordic, THE ECONOMIST, Jul. 29, 1999.
INTERNATIONAL

4. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Snubbed by the West, Tudjman Receives a Posthumous Rebuke,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at A5.
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and by the international community. 5 In addition to dealing with a depressed
economy and a corrupt civil service, the new government led by President Mesic
and Prime Minister Racan immediately sought to re-establish Croatia's ties to
Western Europe,6 and, closer to home, to resolve the outstanding boundary
questions with Slovenia, most notably the maritime delimitation of the Bay of
Piran (the Bay).
The Bay is located on the extreme northern end of the Adriatic Sea. As the
map in the Appendix indicates, the adjacent coasts of the Bay belong to Croatia on
the south, and Slovenia on the north. The Bay's small size (it is less than 10 km
wide at its mouth) does not reflect its importance in maritime delimitation of the
wider geographical area known as the Gulf of Trieste. The peculiar geographic
features of the Gulf of Trieste, bounded by Italy, Slovenia, and Croatia, create an
unusual triangular problem of maritime delimitation.
A straightforward
application of the equidistance principle8 results in enclavement of the Slovenian
territorial sea between the territorial waters of Italy and Croatia, leaving Slovenia
with no extended economic zone and, more importantly, no direct access to the
high seas.
While international law provides for freedom of peaceful navigation and
access to the high seas, 9 the government of Slovenia has insisted on a delimitation
that would result in its territorial waters directly opening to the high seas. As a
small, but commercially active, state,'0 Slovenia views sovereign control over the
access to the high seas as both an economic and military necessity. Given the
geography of the Gulf of Trieste, the only way to achieve the result desired by
Slovenia without disturbing the "external" frontiers of the former Yugoslavia and
Italy, is to delimit the Bay so that about twenty percent of its area remains Croatian
territorial sea, and the rest of it falls under Slovenian territorial sovereignty. This
delimitation would give Slovenia an aperture to the high seas about five kilometers
wide.
Recently, the two governments were involved in close consultations on
various levels, political and legal, trying to resolve the problem of maritime
delimitation. Finally, on July 20, 2001, the prime ministers of the two countries

5. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Pro-Western Opposition Defeats Croatia's Ruling Nationalists,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 2000, at A4.
6. Vinka Drezga, Pregovoris Uniyom do podcetka ljeta? [Negotiations With the Union by This
Summer?], VJESNIK (Zagreb, Croatia), Mar. 29, 2000, at 1.
7. Saga Vidmajer, Vee Kot le Sosedstvo [More Than Mere Neighbors], DELO (Ljubljana,
Slovenia), Mar. 21, 2000, at 1; Mesi& Svi se problemi so Sloven yom mogu ryegiti u obostranom
nteresu [Mesic: All Problems With Slovenia Can be Solved To Mutual Satisfaction], VJESNIK, Mar. 21,
2000, at 1; Edgy Start: Croatia's CautiousNew Government, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 8, 2000.
8. United Nations Convention On The Law Of The Sea, Dec. 10 1982, art. 15, U.N. Doc
A/CONF.62/122 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
9. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 17, protects the right of innocent passage.
10. Slovenia's 2 million inhabitants occupy an area of about 20,000 km2 . The CIA World
Factbook-Slovenia, at http://www.cia.gov/publications/factbook/goes/si.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2002).
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initialed a draft agreement that satisfied Slovenian desires, as described above."i
While the Parliament of Slovenia immediately ratified the agreement, the Croatian
Parliament refused to give its approval, citing abuse of power by the Prime
Minister in ceding territory without the constitutionally required procedures. The
Croatian government, frustrated with the process, called on the two states to submit
to binding third-party arbitration to finally settle the dispute.
Slovenia has, so far, refused the offer to arbitrate, hoping that international
pressure on Croatia will lead to its ratification of the agreement. In this paper, the
author argues that Slovenia and Croatia, and indeed all states, should accept
international arbitration as an effective method for resolving boundary delimitation
disputes. The Charter of the United Nations requires that states settle their disputes
by peaceful means. 12 The Charter, however, does not place an affirmative duty on
states to actually settle their disputes. Keeping in mind the stated goal of the13
United Nations (UN) to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,"'
and realizing that unresolved territorial disputes tend to lead to armed conflicts, the
UN should take affirmative steps to craft an international dispute resolution
infrastructure for settling territorial disputes before they threaten international
peace and security.
International arbitration has been a successful method for solving territorial
disputes for centuries. In Part II of this paper, the author gives an historical
overview of arbitral practice, especially as it relates to boundary disputes. In Part
III, following a survey of territorial disputes since the Second World War, the
author analyzes the aspects of international arbitration that continue to make it a
preferred method of territorial dispute resolution, and proposes a multilateral
agreement under the auspices of the UN, under which states-parties would agree to
compulsory arbitration of their territorial disputes. Finally, the proposed dispute
resolution mechanism is put to the test in Part IV where the author applies it to the
problem of the delimitation of the Bay.
II. ARBITRATING TERRITORIAL DISPUTES - A HISTORICAL

NOTE

The practice of arbitration significantly predates judicial settlement in
international relations, as opposed to municipal law. According to Greek
mythology, the dispute over possession of the Corinthian territory between
Poseidon, god of the sea, and Helios, the sun-god, was settled by Briareus, the
hundred-handed giant acting as an impartial arbitrator. 14 With such a distinguished
pedigree, international arbitration was relied upon by states for settling their
territorial disputes for centuries. Third-party settlement through arbitration is

11. Mihailo Nieota, Slovenya prvi put dobiva izlaz na otvoreno more [Slovenia Gains Access to
the Open Seas For the FirstTime], VJESNIK, July 21, 2001, at 1; Peter Zerjavid, Racan in Morfe [Racan
and the Sea], DELO, July 20, 2001, at 6.
12. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 3.
13. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
14. JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 153
(1929).
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particularly well suited to territorial disputes because the disputants usually have a
high incentive to achieve a timely settlement.
Certainty and stability of
international frontiers is essential for economic development and exploitation of
natural resources, and an authoritative decision-making arbitral panel tends to
imprint legitimacy on a solution that might otherwise be difficult to achieve in
light of domestic political pressures.' 5
While territorial disputes tend to be framed in highly emotional terms, the
disputants typically agree on the applicable law, e.g., the colonial principle of uti
possidetis16 or the application of the equidistance principle 17 to maritime
delimitation. An arbitral tribunal is an excellent medium for taking into account
extensive factual evidence, which usually spans centuries, such as maps, treaties,
and other ancient documents. Where the states have a different view of the
applicable law, as in the dispute between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, the arbitral
tribunal can play only a limited role.' 8 On the other hand, several cases involving
territorial delimitation in similar circumstances were successfully resolved by
arbitration because the disputants were in agreement on the applicability of the uti
possidetis principle, leaving to the arbitral tribunal the technical task of applying
that legal principle to the particular factual context of each dispute. 19 Finally,
arbitration by its very nature tends to produce delimitation solutions whereby both
sides can feel that they achieved at least some of what they desired, making arbitral
solutions an effective way of dealing with domestic political opinion.20
A. Early Origins of Inter State Arbitration
Inter-state arbitration was used as a tool for settling territorial disputes since
the earliest manifestations of statehood and inter-state relations. The treaty
between Sparta and Argos, dating to the fifth century B.C., provided:
If there should arise a difference between any of the towns of the Peloponesus or
beyond, either as to frontiers or any other object, there shall be an arbitration. If

among the allied towns they are not able to come to an agreement,
the dispute will
2
be brought before a neutral town chosen by common agreement.

The Middle Ages saw the organization of units of governance and territory
that may be recognizable as modem states. The disputes that inevitably arose

15. Christine Gray and Benedict Kingsbury, Developments in Dispute Settlement: Inter-state
ArbitrationSince 1945, 63 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 97, 108 (1992).

16. See infra note 149.
17. UNCLOS, supra note 8, at art. 15.
18. See, e.g., Arbitration Tribunal for the Determination of the Maritime Boundary between
Guinea-Bissau and Senegal (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), 1989 I.C.J.126 (July 31, 1989), where GuineaBissau denied the applicability of the uti possidetis principle to a colonial delimitation in treaty in
question.
19. Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 15, at 117.
20. Id. at 108.
21. RALSTON, supra note 14, at 157 (quoting Thucydides).
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among them were most often settled by way of Papal arbitration.22 This arbitral
method was heavily influenced by the historical context of the Papacy, which,
invested with both divine and sovereign power, often acted without regard for law
or justice, having its own interests foremost in mind. Perhaps it is precisely
because the Papal arbitration was more likely to be concerned with attaining and
maintaining order that the earthly princes of Mediaeval Europe often availed
themselves of the dispute resolution mechanism run by the Papacy.23 One of the
more telling illustrations of the power and flexibility of Papal arbitrations is the
award by Pope Alexander V124 who settled disputed claims in the New World
between Spain and Portugal by drawing
an imaginary line from one pole to the
25
other, dividing the territory in half.

The 1794 General Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between
the United States and the United Kingdom (commonly known as the Jay Treaty
after John Jay, the U.S. Secretary of State who negotiated it) formalized, perhaps
for the first time, arbitration as an accepted method for settling complex disputes
among states. 26 One of the issues settled by arbitration under the Jay Treaty was
the boundary line between the remaining British possessions and the United States,
specifically the exact position and course of the St. Croix River. It is interesting to
note that the award was agreed upon by a mixed commission of arbitrators
appointed by the states, who then together appointed one neutral commissioner.
The 1814 Treaty of Ghent, ending the War of 1812 between the United States
and the United Kingdom, provided that four outstanding territorial questions
between the states would be resolved by four separate arbitral panels.27 The
procedural wrinkles in the Treaty of Ghent were slightly different from the Jay
Treaty, giving power to settle the matter to a disinterested sovereign in the event
the mixed commissions appointed by the parties failed to reach an agreement. 28
This recourse to a more old-fashioned arbitral practice, relying on the authority and
putative wisdom of a sovereign, did not prove successful. The question of the
northeastern boundary could not be resolved by the commissioners and was
referred to the King of the Netherlands for his decision. The United States rejected
the King's recommendatory decision that did not follow the terms of the
compromis, and the parties ended up settling the issue through negotiations and the
subsequent Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842.29 This early example, later

22. RALSTON, supra note 14, at 174.

23. The Papacy offered "the singular spectacle of conciliation and peace advancing between
populations of the most warlike character." RALSTON, supra note 14, at 176.
24. Pope Alexander VI, infamous for the deeds of his children, Cesare and Lucrezia Borgia,
ascended to the Papacy in 1492. He was the first Pope to send missionaries to the New World. Catholic
Encyclopedia: Pope Alexander VI, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01289a.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2002).
25. RALSTON, supra note 14, at 181.
26. J. L. SIMPSON & HAZEL Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (1959);
RALSTON, supra note 14, at 191.
27. SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 26, at 2; RALSTON, supra note 14, at 194.
28. SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 26, at 2.
29. Id.; RALSTON, supra note 14, at 194.
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confirmed by modem practice, shows that the success of an arbitral panel largely
depends on the ability of the party-appointed arbitrators to reach an agreement
without recourse to the neutral member of the panel. Territorial disputes, by their
very nature, allow the arbitrators to "temper justice with diplomacy, to give a
measure of satisfaction to both sides. 30
The remainder of the relatively peaceful 19th Century witnessed scores of
inter-state arbitrations dealing with state responsibility, 31 injury to aliens, and
frequent territorial disputes. 32 Disputes over boundaries were not always referred
to mixed expert commissions. States continued to rely on august sovereigns, as in
the Bulama Island case33 and the San Juan de Fuca arbitration.34 The use of mixed
commissions or collegiate courts, however, prevailed towards the end of the
century, perhaps because the European sovereigns realized that arbitral decisions
should no longer be their personal responsibility. The President of France, for
example, having been given broad power by the disputants to resolve the Delagoa
Bay issue between Portugal and the United Kingdom, created a commission of
respected jurists and signed the award that it produced.35
The turn into the 20th Century was marked by two seminal international
gatherings at the Hague in 1899 and 1907, both dealing with the issue of peaceful
settlement of disputes.36 The conferences resulted in two Conventions for the
37
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which devoted extensive treatment
to the arbitral process including the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA), which was supposed to provide the infrastructure for the peaceful world
imagined by the conference participants.
After a promising beginning during which several complex cases were
referred to the PCA and settled,3 8 the institution suffered a steady and welldocumented decline into disuse. 39 Interest in arbitrating territorial disputes,

30. SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 26, at 3.
31. See, e.g., PETER SEIDEL, The Alabama, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,
97-99 (1992), for a discussion on the Alabama Claim between the United States and the United
Kingdom.
32. It has been suggested that frequent recourse to arbitration might have contributed to the
relative calm during the 19 h Century. See Louis B. Sohn, The Function of InternationalArbitration
Today, in 1963 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 10 (1963) [hereinafter InternationalArbitration Today].
33. SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 26, at 7.
34. Id.at 9.
35. Id. at 10-11.
36. Each of the two Hague documents is known as the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
Intemational Disputes. For text of the First Hague Convention of July 29, 1899, see MAJOR PEACE
TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 1115 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1967). The Second Hague Convention of
October 18, 1907 is available at page 1197 of the same volume.
37. 54 articles out of the 97 comprising the Convention are devoted to arbitration. See The
Avalon Project - Laws of War, Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/pacific.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
38. The Pious Fund Case (1902), 9 R.I.A.A. 14; Venezuelan Preferential Case (1904), 9 R.I.A.A.
107; Japanese House Tax Case (1905), 11 R.I.A.A. 51.
39. See, e.g., William E. Butler, The PermanentCourt ofArbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 43 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1992).
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however, remained strong, both by reference to royal settlement as well as mixed
commissions.40 Such commissions were at times granted permanent existence and
jurisdiction over disputes covering specific geographic areas, such as the U.S.Mexico Boundary Commission.4 '
B. Modern Inter-StateArbitration
The UN Charter expressly provided a place for arbitration among the
acceptable methods of peaceful settlement following the Second World War.42
The total number of inter-state arbitrations, however, declined dramatically
compared to the years before the war. A comprehensive survey of inter-state
arbitrations since 1900 indicates that 178 disputes were heard before 1945,
followed by less than fifty since then.43 This apparent disfavor of arbitration is
confirmed by the caseload of the PCA, which saw only a handful of cases referred
to it in the latter part of the 20th Century, following the early flurry of arbitrations
in the years leading up to the Second World War.44
This minimization of the role of arbitration is particularly telling given the
significant increase in the number of states since the war, as well as the
"astoundingly high" number of arbitration clauses inserted into bilateral and
multilateral treaties.45 Furthermore, arbitration remains popular in international
commercial relations.46
The bleak view of inter-state arbitration as a whole, however, does not reflect
its continued role in settling territorial disputes. The number of boundary
delimitation cases referred to arbitration, as a percentage of all arbitrated disputes,
remains steady, accounting for about a quarter of all arbitrations.47 This
phenomenon reflects the fact that territorial sovereignty disputes occur most
frequently when new states are emerging, as during the post-Colonial struggles of
the early post-War period, and the current territorial issues arising out of the

40. EVAN LUARD, FrontierDisputes in Modern InternationalRelations, in THE INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF FRONTIER DISPUTES 7, 26 (1970).

41. The Chamizal Case (1911), 11 R.I.A.A. 316.
42. The Charter lists negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and judicial
settlement. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
43. Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 15, at 98; A. M. STUYT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS 1794-1989 (1990).
44. "Of the twenty-five cases considered by [the PCA...I, twenty-one were disposed of within its
first three decades (1902-1932), one in 1935, and others successively in 1940, 1956, and the last in
1970." Butler, supra note 39, at 43-44.
45. See Gray & Kingsbury supra note 15, at 99. About two hundred bilateral dispute resolution
treaties are listed in UN Secretariat, Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of
InternationalDisputes, 1928-1948, U.N. Sales No. 1949.v.3. (1949). See also H. SMIT & V. PECHOTA,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION TREATIES (1998).
46. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 39, at 44; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter The New York Convention];
United Nations: U.N. Commission On International Trade Law Decision On Arbitration Rules And The
Text Of The Rules, 15 I.L.M. 701 (1976).
47. Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 15, at 108.
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breakdown of the communist states of Eastern Europe.4 g
One of the first and most notable territorial disputes settled by arbitration in
the latter part of the 20th Century was the Western Boundary dispute between
India and Pakistan, better known as the Rann of Kutch Arbitration. 49 The tribunal
was asked to delimit the Rann, a marine feature particular to the area, characterized
by varying degrees of salt-water flooding during the course of each year. India and
Pakistan, which became independent states in 1947 under the provisions of the
British Parliament's Indian Independence Act, abut either side of the Rann in the
old British Dominion of Kutch, near the Arabian Sea. The dispute over the
delimitation of the Rann led to armed hostilities in April, 1965, one of several
transgressions of peace between the parties in the latter part of the century. The
arbitration compromis of June 30, 1965, is notable not only for specifying a
flexible and efficient procedure of settling the dispute, but also for containing
within itself explicit cease-fire provisions ending the hostilities and recognizing the
desires of the disputants to settle their differences amicably. 50 The tribunal's
award, issued on February 19, 1968, was largely respected by India and Pakistan,
notwithstanding their continued differences over territorial delimitation in
Kashmir.
Relying on a somewhat more historic form, Chile and Argentina referred their
territorial dispute to arbitration by Queen Elizabeth II in 1966, 51 and again in 1971
when she was asked to intervene in the recurring problem of the delimitation of the
islands of the Beagle Channel. 2 Recent years saw the creation of a number of ad
hoc tribunals tasked with resolving territorial disputes, most notably the maritime
delimitation between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau in 1985, 53 the 1988 boundary
award concerning the Taba area between Egypt and Israel, 54 the dispute over St.
Pierre and Miquelon between Canada and France settled in 1992, 5 and most
recently, the proceedings under the auspices of the PCA delimiting the maritime
boundary between Yemen and Eritrea.56

48. LUARD, supra note 40, at 10.
49. The Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal, 17 R.I.A.A. 1 (1968).
50. Id. at 7.
51. Hazel Fox, Arbitration, in THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FRONTIER DISPUTES 168,
172 (Evan Luard ed., 1970).
52. In the latter case, Her Britannic Majesty referred the dispute to arbitration by five former ICJ
judges, headed by Judge Fitzmaurice. She ratified their unanimous decision in 1977 which was not
accepted by the parties until 1984 under diplomatic mediation by the Vatican. See FRIEDRICH
KRATOCHWIL ET AL., PEACE AND DISPUTED SOVEREIGNTY 75 (1985).
53. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau: Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary, Feb. 14,
1985, 25 I.L.M. 251.
54. Egypt-Israel Arbitration Tribunal: Award in Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba Area,
Sept. 29, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 1421.
55. Court of Arbitration for the Delimitation of Maritime Areas Between Canada and France:
Decision in Case Concerning Delimitation of Maritime Areas, June 10, 1992,31 I.L.M. 1145.
56. Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration (Maritime Delimitation), Dec. 17, 1999, 40 I.L.M. 983.
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C. ArbitrationandJudicialSettlement
It has been suggested that "no intellectually persuasive distinction can be
made" between modem arbitration and judicial settlement.57 Proponents of this
position point to the relatively recent willingness of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) to temper the "ultra-positivist," strict and literal interpretation of
international law for which it was widely criticized.5 8 Any distinction between
arbitration and adjudication, it is argued, is blurred by the ICJ's increased reliance
on policy-based weighing and equity, along with the relaxation of ICJ Chambers
procedures. 59
Inter-state arbitration and adjudication by the ICJ share many similarities. On
the surface, the procedure followed by the ICJ in the cases of joint notification
closely resembles the arbitral procedure provided by the Hague Conventions. 60 In
both instances, proceedings are initiated by a compromis, a treaty between the
disputants that defines the subject of the dispute, lists relevant facts, and specifies
other procedural details. Arbitral tribunals and the ICJ both enjoy the compdtence
de la compitence, i.e., the presumption that each body has jurisdiction to decide
whether it is competent to hear the case presented to it by the compromis of the
parties. 6' Both situations typically involve presentation of arguments in two
phases - written pleadings and oral arguments.62
The composition of arbitral panels may closely resemble a Chamber of the
ICJ. For example, the five-member panel arbitrating the Beagle Channel dispute
63
between Argentina and Chile was composed entirely of the ICJ judges.
Furthermore, the principles of international law relied upon by the ICJ will
necessarily be reflected in any arbitral decision.
The degree of similarity between arbitration and adjudication, however,
should not mask several important distinctions that may make arbitration the
preferred method for resolving most territorial disputes. Chief among those factors
are secrecy, inability of third parties to intervene, and the flexibility with respect to
the issues to be resolved, the applicable law, the composition of the panel, and
other procedural aspects of an arbitral proceeding.

57. Edward McWhinney, The InternationalCourt as ConstitutionalCourt andthe Blurringof the
Arbitral/Judicial Processes, in THE FLAME REKINDLED: NEW HOPES FOR INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 81, 85 (Sam Muller & Wim Mijs eds., 1993); Professor Brownlie calls the distinction
"formal." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 705 (5th ed.,1998).
58. See McWhinney, supra note 57, at 85, especially referring to the South West Africa Case (Eth.
v. S. Mr.; Liber. v. S. Mr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (Judgment of July 18).
59. The United States and Canada relied on the permissive, although inconclusive, language of
Article 17(2) of the ICJ Rules to select the judges for the Chamber hearing the Gulf of Maine Case,
infra note 91. See, e.g., Shigeru Oda, FurtherThoughts on the ChambersProcedure of the International
Court of Justice, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 556 (1988); Steven M. Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambers of the
InternationalCourtof Justice, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 831 (1987).
60. See Second Hague Convention, supranote 36, at Part IV, Chapter III.
61. I.C.J. STATUTE, art. 36, para. 6; Second Hague Convention, supranote 36, at art. 73.
62. I.C.J. STATUTE, art. 43, para. 1; Second Hague Convention, supranote 36, at art. 63.
63. Beagle Channel Arbitration (Arg. v. Chile), Award of Apr. 18, 1977, 17 I.L.M. 634 (1978).

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 1:1

The Statute and the Rules of the ICJ do not allow for complete secrecy in its
proceedings. To the contrary, the founding documents of the ICJ require that any
compromis and all judgments must be made available to the public and circulated
to all Members of the United Nations. 64 While it is possible, in principle, to
arrange for private written pleadings and oral arguments, this discretion has not
been exercised by the ICJ, and it is not likely that it will be in the future, save in
extraordinary circumstances.65 On the other hand, arbitral proceedings conducted
confidentially allow the disputants to raise arguments free from fear that these may
be cited against them by another state in a later proceeding. The concern about
pressures is also diminished if all proceedings are
playing to domestic political
66
carried out in secrecy.
The ICJ Statute expressly permits intervention by third states where the
interests of the intervening state may be affected by the Court's decision. 67 This
procedural aspect of the ICJ, while ensuring that the Court's proceedings are
detailed and meticulous, may have the effect of further complicating and drawing
out the dispute. For example, the boundary dispute between Cameroon and
Nigeria was submitted to the ICJ in March, 1994 and the Court finally decided the
case on October 10, 2002. The delay was caused, in no small part, by the
intervention of Equatorial Guinea whose potential interests in the broader dispute
between Nigeria and Cameroon are relatively minor. 68
The key feature of arbitration that makes it suitable for resolving territorial
disputes is its flexibility in choosing the panel of arbitrators. The freedom to select
the arbitrators in territorial disputes is not a mere formality meant to give the
parties confidence that the panel will act impartially. It allows states to constitute a
panel that will have the requisite technical expertise, knowledge of the area in
dispute, and appreciation of local culture and customs. 69 Since most territorial
disputes are deeply rooted in local history and involve neighboring states, an
arbitral panel that appreciates such local circumstances will be more likely to
utilize the particular legal and cultural norms observed in the area in order to craft
an imaginative solution that would not be evident to a panel comprised of jurists
without such local knowledge. 70 Furthermore, the ICJ has been criticized for
basing its judgments largely upon uncontested facts. In fact, the ICJ has used its
Channel
power to empanel special fact-finding commissions only in the
72 Corfu
Case, 7' and visits by judges to relevant sites are quite infrequent.

64. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 58, art. 40, para. 3; I.C.J. RULES arts. 42, 93.

65. Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 15, at 110.
66. Id. at 111.
67. I.C.J. STATUTE, art. 62.
68. See Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Camer. v. Niger.; Eq.
See http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icnijudgment_
Guinea intervening).
200210 10.PDF (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
69. See, e.g., Giorgio Bernini, CulturalNeutrality: A Prerequisiteto Arbitral Justice, 10 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 39 (1989).
70. For example, Judge Koo's culturally sensitive dissent in the Case Concerning the Temple of
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 75 (Judgment of June 15).
71. Corfu Channel Case (Merits) (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 9 (Judgment of Apr. 9); see also
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The ICJ has undoubtedly played a significant role in promoting international
law and "civilized methods of settling disputes," but its contribution to attaining
and maintaining peace are not notable.73 The relative merits of numerous scholarly
opinions of the jurisprudence of the ICJ are beyond the scope of this paper.
Suffice it to say that arbitrating territorial disputes should be preferred over their
reference to the ICJ precisely because the ICJ does, as it must, take into account its
own standing and reputation whenever it issues a decision. Such concerns
typically do not surround arbitral tribunals, since their life-span is, by definition,
finite. Perhaps it is the whiff of permanent existence that made the PCA
so under74
utilized that it has been called "the sleeping beauty of the peace palace.
III. INTER-STATE ARBITRATION: AN EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

A. Boundary Disputes as Threats to InternationalPeace andSecurity
In 1907, Lord Curzon called boundaries "the razor's edge on which hang
suspended the modem issues of war and peace, of life or death to nations. 75 The
creation of new states during much of the 20th Century as a result of decolonization and the fall of communism has only reiterated the importance of
boundaries in international relations. The increased number of states resulted in a
relatively large number of territorial disputes, many of which led to armed conflict.
An empirical study of international relations between 1945 and 1974 found 66
disputes having a clear boundary component, of which 24 involved some military
action.76
The most recent territorial disputes that directly threatened international peace
and security were the dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the
Falkland Islands, the recent war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the continuing
dispute over Kashmir between Pakistan and India. Far more frequently, however,
territorial conflicts remain out of sight of the international community, in a state of
low-level animosity that threatens to escalate into a full scale conflict. For
example, the long-standing dispute between Japan and Russia involving the
Habomai Islands continues to be the source of skirmishes, 77 as does the
delimitation between the two Koreas,78 the Aegean Sea delimitation between
Turkey and Greece, 79 and the land and maritime boundary dispute between Nigeria

I.C.J. STATUTE art. 50.

72. Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 15, at 117.
73. BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 728.
74. SAM MULLER & WIM MIJS, The Flame Rekindled, in THE FLAME REKINDLED: NEW HOPES
FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 5, 6 (1993).
75. KRATOCHWIL ET AL., supra note 52, at 3.

76. Id. at 26.
77. BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 302 (Alan J. Day ed., 1982).

78. Id.at 320.
79. KRATOCHWIL ET AL., supra note 52, at 93-95.
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and Cameroon, which was decided by the ICJ in October 2002.80
Studies show that territorial disputes that flare up into armed conflict tend to
be of considerable duration, yet they produce relatively few casualties. 8' It is this
smoldering feature that gives boundary disputes such potential for disturbing
international peace. Another feature of boundary disputes is that the parties have
conflicting as well as common interests, making a zero-sum solution
impracticable. 82 Because the clichd is accurate that boundaries join as well as
divide - they "mediate social relationships and exchanges '8 3 - it is often the case
that an armed resolution to a boundary problem does not end the dispute. A
territorial settlement that is imposed or not fully embraced by both parties will
inevitably resurface, perhaps in an even more violent form, as was the case with
the dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway between Iran and Iraq. The two states
reached an agreement regarding the delimitation in the area in 1975 only to see it
abrogated by an Iraqi invasion in 1980. s4
Territorial disputes, even when they are of a low intensity, continue to
represent a significant threat to the international peace and security. The
international community should strive to settle boundary disputes in their germinal
stages, before they blossom into open hostilities. In order to achieve a stable
settlement, the disputants should be encouraged to engage in a process whereby
their entire relationship
is reconstituted and the expectations of normal relations
85
are established.
B. Compulsory Arbitrationof TerritorialDisputes
The preceding section discusses the potential for boundary disputes erupting
into conflicts that threaten intemational peace and security. This is particularly
true of those conflicts that remain unresolved for a long time, allowing the factual,
rational bases of settlement to give way to emotional posturing. The UN should
engage itself more actively in the process of international dispute resolution by
making recourse to arbitration a compulsory first step in dealing with any dispute
involving territorial sovereignty or boundary delimitation.
Proposals for such a "third Hague Conference" 8 6 were made previously, often
coming from Asian and African nations, which were largely unrepresented during
the first two Hague meetings. Yet the general tenor underlying such proposals is
the creation of a universally acceptable mandatory dispute resolution mechanism
that would be applicable to all states and all disputes. However, as Judge De

80. Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria, supranote 68.

81.

KRATOCHWIL ET AL.,

supranote 52, at 27.

82. Id. at31.
83. Id.
84. BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DIsPUTES, supra note 77, at 218.
85. KRATOCHWIL ET AL., supra note 52, at 31.
86. M.C.W. Pinto, Structure, Process, Outcome: Thoughts on the 'Essence' of International
Arbitration,in 6 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 241,241 (1993).
87. Id.
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Visscher noted, such universal proposals are doomed to failure because they ignore
the "order of importance of the interests involved. 8 8 While arbitration is, in
principle, suitable for resolving a wide range of inter-state disputes, defining the
range of disputes that are well-suited to the process is essential if the arbitration is
to be successful. 8 9
Inter-state arbitration proved itself as an effective method for settling
boundary disputes because its salient characteristics are well-suited to the very
nature of territorial disputes: every case of delimitation is a unicum,90 governed
only by "a few basic legal principles" 9' of international law which must be
weighed against "physical, mathematical, historical, political, economic or other
92
facts.
Therefore, the UN should formalize the requirement to arbitrate territorial
disputes, either through a General Assembly Resolution, or through a widelyattended treaty-making conference. Such an effort would create a tangible
requirement for states to submit their territorial disputes to arbitral decision,
subject to review of procedural issues by the ICJ. Any compulsory international
settlement procedure is vulnerable to criticism that it violates state sovereignty
because it dispenses with the requirement of express consent of states. 93 The
geopolitical reality, however, is that a dispute involving a state that is predisposed
to belligerent posture will not be solved by peaceful means, no matter what form is
adopted. For the vast majority of remaining disputes, the compulsory referral to
arbitration hinges on a "sufficient moral community between the contracting
parties, and, on the other hand, on the condition of general political relations
between them." 94 As Professor Sohn has noted:
Effective legal procedures for dispute settlement are especially important for small
countries and for economically weak States. While larger and more powerful
nations can apply extra-legal, political and economic pressures, it is safer for
smaller and weaker ones to have the dispute 95directed into legal channels where the
principle of equality before the law prevails.
The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of
88. Charles De Visscher, Reflections on the Presentprospects of InternationalAdjudication, 50

AM. J. INT'L L. 467,468-69 (1956).
89. HELEN MAY CORY, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 105 (1932).

90. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau: Dispute Concerning Delimitation of Maritime Boundary, supra note
53, at 289-90.
91. Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can.v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J 246, 290 (Judgment of Oct. 12).
92. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau: Dispute Concerning Delimitation of Maritime Boundary, supra note
53, at 289.
93. "Every recourse of states to international adjudication proceeds from their free will." De
Visscher, supra note 88, at 467. "The authority to decide whether or not to submit a dispute to
international arbitration is an incident of party autonomy and, in the case of inter-state disputes, of state
sovereignty." Pinto, supranote 86, at 260.
94. De Visscher, supra note 88, at 469.
95. Louis B. Sohn, The Role ofArbitrationin Recent InternationalMultilateral Treaties, 23 VA. J.
INT'L L. 171, 171-72 (1983) [hereinafter The Role of Arbitration].
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1907 devoted fifty-four of its ninety-seven articles to a section entitled
International Arbitration.96 Besides creating the PCA, the treaty dealt with such
procedural minutiae as whether the arbitral panel may ask questions of the agents
and the counsel, 97 and the choice of language. 98 The compulsory nature of the
mechanism proposed in this paper should only describe the "manner in which the
decisions of states to have recourse to arbitration are taken," 99 having due regard
for the fact that flexibility is the chief advantage of arbitration over other methods
of dispute resolution. Judge De Visscher stated the principle most succinctly:
To plug up all the openings and to foresee every loophole, in a word, to enclose
arbitration within a rigid framework, runs the risk of hindering its development.
As the Netherlands Government observed, perfectionist
100 aspirations threaten to end
up by 'petrifying' the evolution of arbitral practice.
The Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, 10 1 promulgated by the International
Law Commission in 1958, repeated this error by regulating every aspect of the
arbitral procedure, from a comprehensive compromis, through the provisions
regulating the composition of the panel, to the strict regulation of the sources of
law available to the arbitrators. While the Model Rules are hailed as "the high
watermark of legal scholarship"' 1 2 and were supported by the United States and a
few other Western European states, they were rejected by the majority of General
Assembly Members because they took away the autonomy and flexibility of the
parties in crafting a settlement mechanism that is suitable for them. 0 3 Naturally,
the autonomy of the parties must be bounded by the intrinsic requirements of the
process, viz. the "freedom to negotiate agreementon aspects of the process, not the
freedom to introduce into it any element that serves its own interests or conforms
to its special view of arbitration."' 1°4
It is beyond the scope of this proposal to suggest detailed provisions that may
or must be included in any compromis of arbitration, or to apologize for a
particular choice of procedural approaches. 0 5 Similarly, it would be futile to
attempt to discuss all potential obstacles and problems surrounding inter-state
arbitration as they have been thoroughly treated elsewhere.1°6 The remainder of
this paper discusses only some of the issues that should guide the UN in preparing
the proposed territorial dispute arbitration document: selection of arbitrators, role
96. See Avalon Project, supranote 37.
97. Second Hague Convention, supranote 36, at art. 72.
98. Id. at art. 61.
99. CORY, supranote 89, at ix.
100. De Visscher, supranote 88, at 469-70.
101. International Law Commission, Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure,2 Y.B. I.L.C. 12 (1958).
102. Pinto, supra note 86, at 252.
103. Id. at 253.
104. Id. at 261.
105. Extremely detailed arbitration proposals have been suggested, even ones which "could be
immediately used in practice." Kenneth S. Carlston, Codificationof InternationalArbitral Procedure,
47 AM. J. INT'L L., No. 2,203,205 (1953).
106. STEVEN M. SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS (1987);
InternationalArbitrationToday, supra note 32.
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of equity, and enforcement and control.
1. Composition of the Panels
The right of states to choose their own arbitrators has been hailed as "a right
which is of the very essence of arbitral justice."'' 0 7 Corresponding to the practice
of appointing ad hoc judges in the ICJ, 10 8 it gives confidence to the disputants that
the proceedings of the arbitral panel will not be unfair or prejudicial, and that the
interests and concerns of a particular party will be vigorously represented before
the panel.'0 9 This confidence is likely to translate into respect for the decision
rendered by the panel, even if it is not completely favorable to a particular party.
The need for respecting the wishes of the parties in appointing their own
arbitrators must be weighed against the requirement that the panel must not appear
to be partial or incompetent." 0 As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Black noted, albeit
in a municipal context, one should be "even more scrupulous to safeguard the
impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since the former have completely free rein
to decide the law as well as the facts and are not subject to appellate review."'''
Impartiality, however, must not be confused with neutrality. Neutrality refers to an
objective determination of an arbitrator's conduct with respect to the parties during
the proceedings, whereas partiality is a subjective relationship between the
arbitrator and each individual party. 1 2 Therefore, an arbitrator can be impartial
without being neutral, while no arbitrator can be considered neutral if he or she
acts partially." 3 Arbitrators appointed by a party do not necessarily have to be
citizens of that state. In the Rann of Kutch case, for example, India appointed a
Constitutional Court Judge from Yugoslavia, whereas Pakistan was represented by
an Iranian diplomat." 4 Furthermore, recent history of inter-state arbitrations
indicates that party-appointed arbitrators have, on occasion, voted against the
positions taken by their own state." 5
While territorial disputes have been successfully settled by a single arbitrator,
the preceding section makes it plain that states should prefer to empanel a tribunal
consisting of an equal number of party-appointed arbitrators, along with one or
more neutral members. The most successful and frequently followed method has
been to allow the party-appointed arbitrators to select the neutral members,
although this task could be delegated to an individual or an organization external to
the dispute.
107. Pinto, supra note 86, at 245, quoting Leon Bourgeois, the President of the Second Hague
Conference [emphasis omitted].
108. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 31.
109. Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 15, at I11.
110. Henry P. de Vries, PracticalAspectsof InternationalLitigation - Arbitration, 64 AM. J. INT'L
L., NO. 4, at 251 (1970).
111. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
112. Bernini, supra note 69, at 39.
113. Id.
114. Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Case (Rann of Kutch), 17 R.I.A.A. 9 (1968).
115. See, e.g., Spanish arbitrator's vote in the Lac Lanoux Case (1957), 12 R1I.A.A. 281.
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The power of the disputants to appoint the arbitrators may turn into the "vice"
of the process as it may paralyze or frustrate the establishment of the tribunal. l 6
Previous dispute resolution proposals have spent much ink on detailed provisions
that would ensure the cooperation of the parties in selecting the arbitrators."t 7 Any
modem dispute resolution agreement should reject such formalism because the
proposed compulsory arbitration of territorial disputes must be founded on the a
priori consent and belief of the parties that this particular class of disputes can,
should, and must be resolved early, privately, and equitably. A process of
international settlement has not been invented that would compel a party unwilling
to resolve a dispute amicably to do so. Such a state may frustrate the process by
declining to negotiate a compromis, delaying the appointment of its own arbitrator,
refusing to agree on a neutral member, or by ignoring the award.
A state may, however, have a good-faith objection to the selection of an
arbitrator. In light of the need for expediency and efficiency in settling territorial
disputes, the parties should be given some time, e.g., six months, to agree on the
arbitrators. Failing such an agreement, the proposed dispute resolution procedure
should provide for an external appointment of one or more neutral panelists by a
joint decision of the President of the ICJ and the Secretary General of the UN.
No special requirements should be placed on the qualifications of the
arbitrators. The Hague Convention, for example, required arbitrators to be of
"known competency in questions of international law," and of "highest moral
reputation."' "18 Others have suggested that arbitrators should be "jurists of
repute.""l 9 Such requirements are hortatory at best, meaningless in practice, and at
their worst may be too restrictive and inflexible, causing further frustration of the
process. The parties should be given the complete freedom to agree on an arbitral
panel subject to the appointing authority of the President of the ICJ and the
Secretary General of the UN discussed above.
2. Role of Equity
The parties involved in a territorial dispute must be given broad latitude in
crafting the arbitration compromis as it relates to the choice of law that the tribunal
may rely upon. It would be perfectly acceptable, although not advisable in most
cases, that the parties restrict the tribunal to reliance only on treaty provisions
binding on both parties, or on established principles of international law. In most
some degree of
successful arbitrations, however, the parties gave the tribunal
0
discretion to take into account principles of equity and justice.12
The subject of equity in international dispute settlement is rich, complex, and
controversial both in jurisprudence and academy. The aim of this section is merely
116. SIMPSON & Fox, supranote 26, at 82.

117. See id. at 83 (providing an excellent overview).
118. Second Hague Convention, supra note 36, at art. 44.

119. Carlston, supra note 105, at 209.
120. See MASAHIRO MIYOSHI, CONSIDERATIONS OF EQUITY IN THE SETTLEMENT OF TERRITORIAL
AND BOUNDARY DISPUTES (1993).
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to raise the awareness of the issue of equity in resolving territorial disputes through
arbitration. It is suggested that an arbitration panel given broad powers to decide
equitably is only suited to decided non-legal, political disputes.' 21 While a•.purely
122
political dispute can be resolved only by recourse to an amiable compositeur, or
an umpire not bound by any legal considerations, the modem scholarly view holds
that "equity is built into the legal system."' 123 Especially in territorial disputes,
124
equity should not be viewed as giving "a blank cheque to be filled in by judges.',
On the contrary, a legal resolution of any boundary dispute must be informed by
the particular context in which it arose. 25 As Judge Lachs noted:
Equity aims at proper application of law in a particular case in order to avoid
decisions that are a reflection of 26abstract principles detached from the
circumstances that a tribunal may face.1
In the specific context of a delimitation dispute, the ICJ has noted that
reliance of equity is not merely a matter of "abstract justice, but of applying a rule
of law which itself requires the application of equitable principles."'127 This view
was applied consistently in the modem practice of territorial delimitation where
equity is considered to be "nothing more than the taking into account of complex
historical and geographical circumstances the consideration of which does not
diminish justice but, on the contrary, enriches it.' 12 8 Equity can play such a role by
giving due regard to "considerations of
"tempering the rigors of strict law," or by
1 29
fairness, reasonableness and good faith."'
In a recent arbitral delimitation of territory under the Dayton Peace
Agreement, 30 the tribunal suggested the following non-exhaustive list of equitable
principles that should inform a fair, just, and reasonable award in a territorial
dispute:
(1) the consideration of the factual context of the dispute - the unique political,
economic, historical and geographical circumstances surrounding the dispute [... ]
and (2) a set of equitable doctrines associated with fairness, such as the doctrine of
121. InternationalArbitrationToday, supra note 32, at 24.

122.

RALSTON,

supra note 14, at 23.

123. Manfred Lachs, Equity in Arbitrationand in JudicialSettlement of Disputes, in THE FLAME
REKINDLED: NEW HOPES FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 125, 127 (Sam Muller & Wim Mijs eds.,
1993).
124. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 317

(1973).
125. "It is needles to say that each territorial or boundary arbitration, like any other kind of
arbitration, is sui generis with its own peculiarities of historical, political, economic, and cultural
backgrounds and implications." MIYOSHI, supra note 120, at 99.
126. Lachs, supra note 123, at 127.
127. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 47 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
128. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 106. (Judgment of Feb.
24, Arechaga, J, Sep. Op.).
129. Case Conceming Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den.
v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 613 (Judgment of June 14, J. Weeramantry, Sep. Op.).
130. Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia:General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia andHerzegovina, 35 1.L. M. 75 (1996) [citations omitted].
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unclean hands, by which the inequitable conduct of one of the parties may be
taken into account in the decision. 131
Since most disputes over territory will not be suitable for a strict legal
determination or for an award that completely ignores legal principles, arbitration
compromis should give the tribunals broad flexibility to rely on equitable criteria in
applying the legal principles that govern territorial delimitation. 132
3. Enforcement and Control
It should be emphasized that this section deals with control and enforcement
of awards concerning parties that were willing and active participants in the
underlying arbitral process. Therefore, the focus is not on ensuring compliance or
participation by an unwilling disputant, but, rather, maintenance of a fair and
impartial process with the view of establishing an international dispute mechanism
in which all states can have full confidence. Maintaining some control over the
process is especially important where, as here, a compulsory framework is
proposed. As Professor Reisman has noted, "[I]egal decision without control runs
the danger of reducing predictability, and rational actors are unlikely to submit
matters that are important to them to a voluntary dispute system that ranges from
1 33
uncertain to capricious."
The most basic, yet often overlooked, aspect of control is ensuring full
domestic support for arbitration and its outcome, whatever it may be. This is
particularly important in territorial disputes, which often involve emotional issues
such as possible cession of territory to an erstwhile enemy, or the loss of control
over historically significant areas. Furthermore, many states, under their municipal
laws, require that any changes in boundaries be supported by super-majority votes
in their parliaments. 134 To that end, states should seek ratification of the arbitration
compromis by the same method as is required for modification of boundaries or
cession of territory.
The essential feature of arbitration is that it produces an award that is final
and binding.135 Especially in the case of compulsory arbitration, however, this rule
is subject to the condition that the award is within the parameters prescribed by the
parties in the compromis, and that the tribunal followed procedure that was
fundamentally fair. If either of the two conditions is not met, the disputants may
consider the award a nullity and ignore the award.
The first requirement reflects the classical maxim, arbiter nihil extra
compromissum facere potest, according to which an arbitrator must respect the
131. Award in the Republika Srpska v. The Federationof Bosnia and Herzegovina (Control over
the Brcko Corridor),36 1. L. M. 396, 427 (Feb. 14, 1997).
132. See MIYOSHI, supra note 120, at 103 (discussing the possible ramifications of the exact
provision chosen).
133. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND

(1992).
134. See, e.g., CROAT. CONST. art. 8.
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135. SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 26, at 250.

2002

COMPULSORY INTER-STATE ARBITRATIONS

agreement of the parties as to the scope of the award. 136 This doctrine of excks de
pouvoir was raised, for example, by the United States in the Northeastern
Boundary Award by the King of the Netherlands who was given the power to
lines proposed by the parties, yet he drew a
choose between two delimitation
37
own.1
his
of
line
boundary
The second defense by a "losing" party rests on the objections to the
procedural aspects of the arbitral proceedings. Sometimes referred to as denial of
justice, this doctrine specifies that an award is void if it resulted from a procedure
that lacked the aspects of fundamental fairness "inherent in the judicial process, or
which are generally recognized by civilized nations." 138 Procedural objections
may be raised, for example, where the tribunal fails to observe the rule of audi
alterampartem, i.e., fails to afford each party equal opportunity to be heard during
all stages of the proceedings. 139 This objection strikes not only at the procedural
fairness of the arbitration, but also at the capacity of the tribunal to render a fully
informed judicial determination. 140 In order to avoid even an appearance of denial
should, furthermore, be required to clearly state the
of justice, arbitral tribunals
14 1
reasons for the award.
The doctrines of nullity give states some potential for abuse of the
international arbitration process. A state unhappy with an award may unilaterally
claim that the award reaches beyond the compromis or that it was procured
unfairly. To ensure that such a state is not "simultaneously prosecutor, judge and
jury in sua causa,"'4 2 claims of nullity must be referred to the ICJ for final
determination. Professor Reisman draws a distinction between appeal and control,
noting that appeal is concerned with a wide range of issues directly affecting the
parties in questions, whereas control systems are meant to preserve the underlying
process itself.143 While the proposed reference of nullity disputes to the ICJ may
be framed in the form of an appeal, the ICJ should be given only the power to
determine whether the claims of nullity may be sustained, without performing any
true appellate review of the substantive issues between the parties.
This "reviewing" function is not new to the ICJ, which has on numerous
occasions dealt successfully with the issue of the obligation of states to submit to
arbitration, as well as the determination of the validity or nullity of an award. '44 It
has been noted that the ICJ "has been scrupulous in maintaining the sharp

136. REISMAN, supra note 133, at 6.

137. SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 26, at 250.
138. Id. at 252-3.
139. Id. at 253.
140. Eastern Carelia Case, 1923 P. C. I. J., SER. B., No.5, at 28-9.
141. It was not customary for heads of states to give reasons for their arbitral awards. Modem
arbitrators, however, should be required to either signify their assent to the decision or to issue their
own separate or dissenting views, as is the case with the ICJ. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 56.
142. REISMAN, supra note 133, at 6.
143. Id. at 8.
144. See, e.g., Concerning the Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain on December 23, 1906
(Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 I.C.J. 192 (Nov. 18); Concerning the Arbitral Award of July 31, 1989 (GuineaBissau v. Sen), 1991 1.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12).
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distinction between its own functions in the concrete case brought before it, and
those of the organ in question."' 145 While it may be difficult to separate the
question of validity of an award from the underlying substantive issues about
which the ICJ must not trespass upon the province of the arbitral tribunal, the ICJ
has shown, e.g., in the Ambatielos Case, that it is capable of the requisite
finesse. 146
As with any international judgment, the question of its enforcement is quickly
raised, usually by those with little faith in the efficacy of international law. While
the detailed treatment that this subject deserves is beyond the scope of this work, it
should be noted that a functioning international community is predicated on some
degree of self-policing. As Secretary-General Kofi Annan has recently noted,
"[r]espect for international legal obligations is an indispensable core of the system
we seek."' 1 47 It is noteworthy that the very same sentiment was echoed in the
beginning of the 20th Century by Professor Ralston, who wrote:
The great interest of every state internationally is to stand well with its fellows,
and any departure from a course of conduct sanctioned by mankind generally
carries punishment of some sort. There is further much greater reason for
observing an award than there is for paying obeisance to an abstract principle of
law. 148
IV. ARBITRAL SOLUTION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION BETWEEN CROATIA AND
SLOVENIA
The maritime boundary between Croatia and Slovenia has a colorful history.
After their secession from Yugoslavia in January, 1992, they established a land
boundary that followed the internal, administrative boundaries of the former
Yugoslavia, under the principle of uti possidetis, as required by the EC as a
condition of its recognition of the new governments in Zagreb and Ljubljana. 149
The internal boundaries of the former Yugoslavia were established during the
Second World War and immediately thereafter, largely following the boundaries
50
between wartime partisan administrative units.'

145. Shabtai Rosenne, The International Court of Justice and InternationalArbitration, in THE
FLAME REKINDLED: NEW HOPES FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 122 (Sam Muller & Wim Mijs

eds., 1993).
146. See Ambatielos Case (Greece v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 14 (July 1); see also SIMPSON & FOX,
supra note 26, at 77.
147. Kofi Annan, The Effectiveness of the InternationalRule of Law in MaintainingInternational
Peace and Security, in INTERNATIONAL ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE 158 (Int'l Bureau of the PCA ed., 2000).

148. RALSTON, supra note 14, at 108.
149. Under the utipossidetis approach, colonial demarcations are preserved where colonial entities
emerge as new States. See, e.g., Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 565-7;Dec. 20);
see also Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinion No 3,311. L. M. 1488, 1499 (Jan.
11, 1992) (Discussing the direct applicability of uti possidetis to Yugoslavia); BROWNLIE, supra note
57, at 133.
150. VLADIMIR DEDIJER, HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA (1974).
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Unfortunately, this principle could not be applied to maritime delimitation as
the dominion over the territorial seas before the break-up of Yugoslavia was
reserved as a federal issue, hence the boundary between the former republics on
the sea never existed. During the 1990s, Slovenia and Croatia put forth conflicting
claims over the Bay, leading to occasional localized armed hostilities. The chief
difficulty in delimiting the Bay is its peculiar position within the greater context of
the Gulf of Trieste, and the inviolability of the previous "external" maritime
boundary between Yugoslavia and Italy. This maritime boundary was established
by the 1975 Treaty of Osimo, which finally settled the post-war dispute over the
land and maritime areas in the Northern Adriatic.15 '
Following a decade of intermittent negotiations, the two governments reached
an agreement about the delimitation of the Bay on July 20, 2001. As the map in
the Appendix shows, the Croatian cabinet was willing not only to eschew the
equidistance principle of maritime delimitation, but also to reclassify a corridor of
Croatian territorial waters as open sea, creating a direct connection between
Slovenian territory and the high seas. While this agreement was immediately
accepted by Slovenia, it was met with harsh and widespread criticism in Croatia,
by the opposition parties, legal and political scholars, 152 as well as the general
public. The widely held view in Croatia is that the government gave away too
much, giving up about 20 km 2 of its territory in exchange, as is believed, for
Slovenia's concessions regarding several outstanding issues, as well as Slovenia's
support for Croatia's own desires to more closely integrate itself with the West.
Furthermore, the opponents of the agreement claim that the government of
Prime Minister Racan overstepped its authority by ceding territory without the
constitutionally required parliamentary super-majority vote. The only solution, the
opponents claim, is to submit the dispute to international arbitration where the
strict application of the equidistance method, a legal phrase that has entered into
the every-day Croatian lexicon, would divide the Bay in half, leaving Slovenian
territorial waters without direct contact with the high seas. Slovenian politicians
and pundits reject arbitration, claiming that Croatia should honor the agreement
reached by the two governments. A frequently heard explanation in Slovenia is
that the two states should strive to reach an agreement without external influence
to show the international community they are mature participants in the
community of nations and that they are capable of resolving their differences
amicably. The undertone to the discussion, however, seems to be that Slovenia is
not prepared to submit the dispute to binding arbitration for fear the award would
not address its principal concern - access to the open seas.
Had there existed a UN-administered obligation to submit territorial disputes
to arbitration ten years ago, it is likely that the dispute between Slovenia and
Croatia would have been settled early and quietly, and that the delimitation
reached by an arbitral tribunal would closely resemble that negotiated by the two
151. See, e.g., DAY, supra note 77, 73-4; 25"h Anniversary of the Osimo Agreements, available at
http://www.uvi.si/eng/new/background-information/osimo (last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
152. For the views of one Croatian legal scholar, see, Law of the Sea & Maritime Law, at
http://www.lawofthesea.net/piranski-zaljev.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
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Governments in July, 2001. In fact, having in mind the salient features of interstate arbitration of boundary disputes discussed in this paper, Slovenia should
consider acquiescing to the popular opposition in Croatia and submit the dispute to
binding arbitration. It is likely that arbitration would result in an equitable result
giving Slovenia sovereign access to the high seas. The alternative is to continue
negotiations in an emotionally charged atmosphere, keeping in mind the volatility
and unpredictability of the Croatian political landscape.
Slovenia and Croatia should negotiate a flexible arbitration compromis that
would provide for secret proceedings before a tribunal that is empowered to
delimit the maritime boundary between the two states in the Bay according to legal
and equitable principles. Secrecy in these proceedings would be of the utmost
importance, as Croatia must be given the flexibility to advance positions that may
be prejudicial to its other outstanding maritime delimitation questions, viz. those
with Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina." 3
The principal question before the tribunal would be whether there exist
sufficient historical, geographical, economical, cultural, or political circumstances
that would support Slovenia's contention that the Bay should not be delimited
according to the principle of equidistance. A similar situation was presented to the
arbitral tribunal in the Maritime Delimitation Case between Guinea and GuineaBissau where the tribunal pointed out that:
[it] considers that the equidistance method is just one among many and that there
is no obligation to use it or give it priority, even though it is recognized as having
a certain intrinsic value because
54 of its scientific character and the relative ease
with which it can be applied.1
Another tribunal tasked with drawing a maritime boundary between French
island possessions and Canada noted that while "geographical features are at the
heart of the delimitation process," they "do not, in themselves, determine the line
to be drawn."'15 5 Finally, the ICJ has also recognized that strict application of the
equidistance principle "leads unquestionably to inequity" in a number of cases
56
where the underlying geographical features are unusual.1
Both the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau and the France/Canada tribunals rejected
blind applications of the equidistance principle where it would lead to a cut-off
effect or enclavement. 157 In the case of the Bay, however, Croatia may distinguish
the situation by pointing out that there is no internationally recognized right that a
state's territorial sea should abut the high seas. Furthermore, it could be argued,
Croatia must, as a party to the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, respect the
153. The Central Adriatic town of Neum belongs to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is not
inconceivable that Bosnia and Herzegovina might demand from Croatia a sovereign channel to the high
seas if such a concession is made to Slovenia.
154. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation, supra note 53, at 294.
155. Canada/France Maritime Delimitation, supranote 55, at 1160.
156. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den.; F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3,49 (Feb. 20).
157. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation, supra note 53, at 298; Canada/France Maritime
Delimitation, supra note 55, at 1170.
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right of Slovenian vessels to free navigation to the open seas. 58 The interest of
Slovenia for a sovereign access to the high seas, however, has both a
commercial' 59 and a military component, the latter stemming from Slovenia's
desire to join NATO. If the Bay were delimited according to the equidistance
be in the position to control access to
principle, the Government of Croatia would
160
Slovenian ports by NATO's warships.
Of the equities working in Croatia's favor, the strongest are its desire to
maintain a territorial boundary with Italy and the historical fishing rights of
Croatian fishermen in the Bay.
The delimitation negotiated by the two
governments (shown in the Appendix) contemplates a sliver of Croatian territorial
sea between the territorial waters of Italy and the corridor of Croatian waters that
would be internationalized. Maintaining direct contact with Italy is important due
to the historical, cultural, and economic ties between the two Adriatic nations.' 6 1
Following the break-up of Yugoslavia, Croatia's only boundary with Italy is in the
Gulf of Trieste and Croatia is keen to keep it.
Furthermore, the rich waters of the Bay were fished for generations both by
Slovenian and Croatian fishermen. 62 While Croatia has a long and beautiful
coast, 163 the interests of the fishing communities on the Croatian side of the Bay
must be taken into account locally. The proposed delimitation of the Bay, where
only twenty percent of its area would remain Croatian, would be unpopular at best
with the local population, and it may endanger the very survival of the traditional
fishing culture in the area.
The settlement negotiated by the two governments appears, on its face, to be
too one-sided, giving Slovenia everything that it asked for, and leaving Croatia
virtually nothing in return, at least not in the area of the Bay. 164 A legal and
equitable solution to the delimitation problem must, if possible, address the

158. UNCLOS, supra note 8, at Part 11,sect. 3.
159. Slovenia's strategic position makes it an important transportation hub of Central Europe. The
Port of Koper handles much of Austrian and Hungarian trade, and Ljubljana, the capital city, is located
on the crossroads of two major motorways planned by the EU. Going Nordic, supra note 3.
160. Article 19(2) of the UNCLOS, supra note 8, lists situations in which the coast state has the
right to deny passage through its territorial sea. Furthermore, a significant number of states require
prior authorization for the passage of warships. BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 194.
161. The Treaty of Osimo, besides setting the boundary in the Gulf of Trieste, contains detailed
provisions regarding the treatment of ethnic minorities that were separated from their nations as a result
of the delimitation.
162. See Darja Mihelic, The Bay of Piran: Towards the Tradition of FishingandFishingRights, 14
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(1998),

at
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kp.si/Zaloznistvo/annales/analil4/mihelic.htm#eng (last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
163. Croatia's mainland coastline stretches for almost 1,800 km. See The CIA World Factbook,at
http://www.cia.gov/publications/factbook (last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
164. It has been speculated that Prime Minister Racan acquiesced to the Bay of Piran delimitation
in exchange for a promise, or perhaps even a commitment, for Slovenian concessions regarding other
open questions between the two states, such as the jointly-built nuclear power plant at Krsko and the
status of the Croatian deposits in Slovenian banks. Marko Barisic, Sto Dobiva Hrvatska u Zamjenu za
Odricanje od Dijela Svoga Teritoria [What is Croatia Getting in Return for Ceding a Part of its
Territory], VJESNIK, July 21, 2001, at 1.
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interests of both sides. To that end, an arbitral tribunal in this case might delimit
the Bay exactly as is shown in the Appendix, but on the condition that certain
economic concessions are made. For example, the arbitral award may require
Slovenia to respect the historical fishing rights of Croatian fishermen in the entire
Bay. Furthermore, Slovenia would be required to give up any further economic
claims with respect to the delimitation of the Gulf of Trieste, viz. it would not seek
any further rights to the continental shelf, or establishment
of special contiguous or
65
exclusive economic zones in the Northern Adriatic. 1
V. CONCLUSION

The UN Charter demands that states settle their disputes peacefully, but the
UN has not been sufficiently active in encouraging states to take affirmative steps
towards settling their differences.
This passive approach is especially
counterproductive in territorial delimitation disputes, which have a great potential
to threaten the international peace and security if they are not identified and settled
early.
The UN should consider convening a multilateral treaty-making conference
with the goal of setting up a new regime of recourse to inter-state arbitration as a
compulsory first step in resolving any outstanding territorial sovereignty or
boundary delimitation dispute. The compulsory nature of the process would
ensure that those states that are ready to settle their disputes peacefully would have
an internationally sanctioned outlet to do so, along with a shield against domestic
political forces that might prefer diplomatic or even hostile posturing over
amicable settlement.
Disputants should retain broad flexibility in the selection of the arbitration
panel and the choice of applicable law. The proposed dispute resolution
mechanism should include the right to appeal to the ICJ for final and binding
determination of all procedural aspects, such as the existence of the obligation to
arbitrate and the validity of the award.
The maritime delimitation dispute over the Bay of Piran was an
uncomfortable distraction to the diplomacies of both Slovenia and Croatia for over
ten years. While this particular dispute has not resulted in any significant military
conflagrations, it has seen its share of emotional flare-ups. More importantly,
perhaps, the dispute will continue to be a diplomatic obstacle for both emerging
nations in their attempts to join the European integration processes.
The settlement that was negotiated in July, 2001 serves as a suitable starting
point, but it will, in its present form, not be politically acceptable in Croatia. The
best course of action would undoubtedly be for the two neighbors and friends to
reach a solution on their own by negotiation. If, however, it becomes apparent that
this cannot be accomplished in a relatively short time, recourse should be taken to
an arbitral tribunal whose final and binding award would, if constituted and carried
out properly, carry the weight and moral authority of international law. As such, it
165. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 8, at Part II, sect. 4; Part V.
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would, almost certainly, be acceptable both to Croatia and Slovenia, popularly and
politically.

APPENDIX - MAP OF THE BAY OF PIRAN

ITALY

aKoper,

*h

20kn= 11nm= 12.5 mi

1- Equidistance line of delimitation of the Bay of Piran.
2- Delimitation line agreed by the two Governments on July 20, 2001.
3 - Corridor of Croatian territorial sea that is to be internationalized.
4- Sliver of Croatian territorial sea maintaining direct boundary with Italy.
5 - "External" maritime boundary according to the 1975 Treaty of Osimo.
6- Area of the Bay of Piran that would become Slovenian territorial sea.
(Adapted by author from map appearing in VjiSIK, Sept. 24,2001 at 5,available at http://www'lawofthesea'nettimages/mgranica'jpg)

